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PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS
I. LONG-ARM STATUTE
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held, in Gatewood v. Fiat, S.p.A. ,' that a District of Columbia court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person alleged to have caused a tor-
tious injury through an act or omission outside the District under the Dis-
trict of Columbia's "long-arm" statute.2 The court may exercise
jurisdiction provided the defendant (1) regularly does business in the Dis-
trict; (2) engages in any persistent course of conduct in the District; or (3)
derives substantial revenue from goods used in the District, and provided
the claim arises out of an injury occurring in the District.3
Gatewood, a Maryland resident, was injured in an automobile accident
that occurred in the District of Columbia. He filed a diversity action in
federal district court against Fiat. The court of appeals rejected Fiat's con-
tention that the action should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
under section 13-423(b).4 Fiat maintained that personal jurisdiction could
be invoked only when the "injury prompting the law suit result[s] from (1)
the actual solicitation of business, (2) persistent course of conduct, or (3)
derivation of substantial revenue, in the District."' 5 The court stated that
when jurisdiction is based upon section 13-423(a)(4), subsection (b) re-
quires only that the claim for relief arise out of an injury occurring in the
District. It is not necessary to show that such injury was directly related to
actual business solicitation, course of conduct, or derivation of revenue
1. 617 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. D.C. CODE § 13-423 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a per-
son, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the
person's-
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia;
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a
claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him.
3. 617 F.2d at 825 (emphasis in original).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. 617 F.2d at 824.
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within the District. Here, although Fiat had no franchised dealers located
within the District of Columbia, there were fourteen Fiat dealerships lo-
cated in the metropolitan area. Their aggregate sales constituted about
1.5% of the total Fiat sales in the United States.6 The court concluded that
Fiat obtained "substantial revenue" from these sales and that this fell
within the ambit of the District's "long-arm" jurisdiction under section 13-
423(a)(4).
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Varela v. Hi-Lo Powered Stirrups, Inc. ,' the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that, under Rule 3 of the Civil Rules of the District
of Columbia Superior Court,8 the filing of a complaint by itself tolls the
applicable statute of limitations. Varela had filed his complaint before the
statutory period of limitations ran but did not attempt service of process
until three days after the statute had run. The court stated that Varela had
satisfied the statute of limitations and that any question of plaintiff's lack
of due diligence in securing service of process was covered by Rule 4(a),9
for which a Rule 41(b)'I motion to dismiss provides the appropriate rem-
edy. The court explicitly overruled its reading of Rule 3 in Criterion Insur-
ance Co. v. Lyles," which imposed on plaintiff the additional obligation of
delivering the summons to the marshal for service before the statute of
limitations would be tolled.
The District of Columbia's current interpretation is consistent with all
federal circuits that have addressed this issue.I2
III. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Bernay v. Sales,13 es-
chewed a strictly literal reading of Superior Court Civil Rule 41(a)(l) 4 in
6. Id at 827.
7. 424 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1980).
8. D.C. SUPER. CT.-Civ. R. 3 states: "A civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court."
9. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 4(a) states in pertinent part: "Upon receipt and due no-
tation thereof, the clerk shall return all but one copy of the summons to the plaintiff or his
agent for service of process in accordance with section (c) of this rule."
10. D.C. SUPER CT.-CIv. R. 41(b) reads in part: "For failure of the plaintiff to prose-
cute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal
of an action or of any claim against him."
II. 244 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1968).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1978); International Controls
Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
13. 424 A.2d 123 (D.C. 1980).
14. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 41(a)(l) reads in pertinent part: "[A]n action may be
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favor of a more flexible interpretation. Plaintiff Sales had filed a com-
plaint against defendant Bernay alleging loss of consortium, alienation of
affection, and criminal conversation. The two latter causes of action have
been abolished by statute in the District of Columbia. t5 After several pre-
trial motions had been made, Sales filed a notice of dismissal of her com-
plaint. Since she filed the notice before either defendant had served an
answer or motion for summary judgment, Sales was technically entitled to
a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1). The court of appeals held
that, despite such literal compliance with the requirements of Rule
41(a)(1), the plaintiff was not entitled to a voluntary dismissal as a matter
of right. Such a strict interpretation of the rule would violate its pur-
poses.' 6 Instead, the facts of this case justified the more liberal approach
to Rule 41(a)(1) followed by a minority of other jurisdictions.' 7 Under the
minority view adopted by the court, voluntary dismissal, as a matter of
right, is prohibited where all three of the following conditions exist: (1) the
merits of the controversy have been fully presented to the court; (2) the
defendant has expended considerable amounts of time and effort in estab-
lishing his defense; and (3) the plaintiff's chances of success on the merits
are extremely remote.' 8 Since all three factors were present in the case, the
court remanded the action to the trial court to determine whether volun-
tary dismissal was warranted.
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in William J. Davis, Inc.
v. Young' 9 that evidence of an employer's fraudulent concealment of ma-
terial facts, giving rise to an action for unpaid compensation, tolls the
three-year statute of limitations. In such a case, the statute does not begin
to run until the factual basis for the action is discovered or reasonably
should have been discovered.
Young's employer concealed information that the minimum wage had
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment,
whichever first occurs...."
15. D.C. CODE § 16-923 (Supp. V 1978).
16. The court identified these purposes as (1) limiting voluntary dismissal as a matter of
right to the early states of litigation, and (2) preventing a plaintiff from running for cover
after the defendant has expended a significant amount of time and effort in preparing his
defense. 424 A.2d at 127.
17. See Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953). But see Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1979).
18. 424 A.2d at 125.
19. 412 A.2d 1187 (D.C. 1980).
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increased and continued to pay Young at the former rate. Young learned
of his right to a higher wage, and sued for the unpaid wages, after the
statute of limitations had run.z° The court of appeals held that the em-
ployer's actions constituted fraudulent concealment. This warranted an
exception to the general rule that a cause of action for compensation ac-
crues on the date the compensation is due. In light of the remedial pur-
pose underlying the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act, the court
extended the common law exceptionZtfrom the usual rule for fraudulent
concealment of a cause of action to actions for unpaid minimum wages.
V. NOTICE OF CLAIM
In DeKine v. District of Columbia,22 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that, under the claims notice provision of section 12-309 of
the District of Columbia Code,23 the District government must actually
receive notice of the claim within six months of the injury. The mere mail-
ing of the notice is insufficient.
On April 30, 1975, DeKine's attorney mailed a letter giving notice of a
claim for damages against the District arising out of an incident alleged to
have occurred on October 31, 1974. The Mayor's office received the letter
on May 2, 1975. To determine whether the notice was timely under sec-
tion 12-309, the court construed the phrase "has given notice in writing to
the Mayor ' 24 within six months. The court found that, although DeKine
mailed the notice of claim within six months of the alleged incident, the
Mayor's office received the notice one day late. This barred recovery. The
court held that the timeliness of notice of a claim under section 12-309 is
based upon the actual receipt of the notice, and not its mailing.25
20. The claim arose under the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act, D.C. CODE
§§ 36-401 to -419 (1973 & Supp. V. 1978).
21. See, e.g., King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C. 1978); Weisberg v.
Williams, Connolly & Califano, 390 A.2d 992, 995-96 (D.C. 1978).
22. 422 A.2d 981 (D.C. 1980).
23. D.C. CODE § 12-309 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliqui-
dated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or
damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writ-
ing to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia of the approximate time,
place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.
24. Id
25. The court stated that placing the consequences of slow postal service upon the
claimant was not unfair, since the method of delivering written notice was entirely within





In Konstantinidis v. Chen,26 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit declined to adopt the doctrine of judicial es-
toppel27 for the District. Plaintiff was injured in a fall at work and stated
in a workmen's compensation application that the resulting injuries were
due to this fall. Subsequently, plaintiff brought a medical malpractice ac-
tion against defendant Chen, claiming that Chen's negligent medical treat-
ment caused the same injuries. Chen argued that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel barred the malpractice suit. The court noted that no District of
Columbia court had ever adopted the doctrine.
Judicial estoppel is presently followed by a distinct minority of jurisdic-
tions and no trend toward wider acceptance has appeared.28
B. Collateral Estoppel
In Jackson v. District of Columbia,29 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals abolished the requirement of mutuality3° for the defensive use of
collateral estoppel provided that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportu-
nity to litigate the issues in the prior suit. After being arrested by mistake
in a pre-dawn raid, Jackson sued the federal agents and the District of
Columbia police officers who participated in the raid, alleging a violation
of his right to privacy. To achieve personal jurisdiction, Jackson filed suit
against the federal agents in federal district court and against the police
officers in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The federal
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant federal
agents.3 '
26. 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
27. The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from contradicting testimony or
pleadings successfully maintained in a prior judicial proceeding. Unlike the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel does not require proof of privity, reliance, or prejudice
by the party seeking to invoke the estoppel. The purpose behind judicial estoppel is to
safeguard public confidence in the administration of justice by restraining any tendency to
make false assertions under oath. See generally lB MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[8]
(2d ed. 1980).
28. 626 F.2d at 938; see, e.g., Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437-38 (10th
Cir. 1956).
29. 412 A.2d 948 (D.C. 1980).
30. The doctrine of mutuality generally requires that one who invokes the conclusive
effect of a judgment must have been either a party or is privy to the suit in which the judg-
ment was rendered. See lB MooRE's FEDERAL PRACICE 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1980).
31. Jackson v. Young, No. 77-1010 (D.D.C. May 4, 1978), affdmem., 600 F.2d 280
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
19811
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The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the prior judgment
of the federal court collaterally estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the
same issue in the municipal court, despite the absence of mutuality of par-
ties. The court stated that considerations of judicial economy and the pol-
icy against repetitious litigation justified its precluding the plaintiff from
relitigating the same issue in a different court by merely switching adversa-
ries.32 The Jackson court adopted the modern trend followed by
other jurisdictions. 33
VII. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A. Motion to Vacate
In Clark v. Moler,34 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals an-
nounced that a motion to vacate a default judgment on the ground of ex-
cusable neglect would succeed under Rule 60(b) of the Civil Rules of the
District of Columbia Superior Court35 if the movant presented only a
primafacie showing of his defense. The movant did not have to demon-
strate that the defense would be likely to succeed.
After Clark's attorney failed to file a timely answer to the original com-
plaint, the clerk entered a default against Clark pursuant to Rule 55(a).36
After a default judgment was entered three years later, Clark filed a Rule
60(b) motion to vacate on the ground of excusable neglect. The court of
appeals found that Clark's reliance upon her attorney's assurances that her
case was progressing satisfactorily constituted excusable neglect under
Rule 60(b). In considering her motion to vacate the default judgment, the
trial court erred in requiring the movant to demonstrate that she would be
32. 412 A.2d at 953.
33. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of IU. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1973). It
should be noted that the abrogation of mutuality decided in Jackson extends only to the
defensive use of collateral estoppel. The court stated that the role of mutuality in the offen-
sive use of collateral estoppel was not at issue in the case. 412 A.2d at 953 n. 11. However, it
would appear that the demise of mutuality for the offensive use of collateral estoppel is but a
short step away. See Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F. Supp.
313 (D.D.C. 1980) (when interpreting Jackson in a diversity action, the court found that
District of Columbia law permits use of offensive collateral estoppel without mutuality).
34. 418 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1980).
35. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 60(b) states in pertinent part: "On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect ....
36. D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 55(a) allows for an entry of default by the clerk of the
court when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided.
[Vol. 30:773
Practice & Pleadings
"likely to succeed" on the merits. In light of the judicial policy favoring a
trial on the merits,37 the proper standard was to require the movant to
establish only aprimafacie meritorious defense.38
B. Multiple Defendants
In Hudson v. Ashley,39 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that, where multiple defendants are named, a default entered against one
defendant should not become a final decree until the liability of the other
defendants is determined on the merits. In this case, a law firm sued a
father and son to collect unpaid legal fees. The trial court entered a de-
fault against the son for failure to appear at a pretrial hearing. After the
plaintiff's opening statement, the court granted the father's motion for a
directed verdict. Since this absolved the father of liability while the son
remained subject to the default, the court of appeals reversed and re-
manded the case for a trial on the merits. The court maintained that enter-
ing a default against one defendant while directing a verdict in favor of a
co-defendant was legally inconsistent. In such a situation, the correct pro-
cedure would have been to enter a default against the first defendant pur-
suant to Rule 55(a) of the Civil Rules of the District of Columbia Superior
Court," and to proceed on the merits against the co-defendant.4 The
court followed the trend of other jurisdictions42 in extending this proce-
dure to situations in which the co-defendants have "closely-related"
defenses.43
37. See, e.g., Jones v. Hunt, 298 A.2d 220, 221 (D.C. 1972).
38. Clark v. Moler, 418 A.2d at 1043-44.
39. 411 A.2d 963 (D.C. 1980).
40. See note 36 supra.
41. The court followed the principle set forth in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
552 (1872):
The true mode of proceeding where a bill makes a joint charge against several
defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a default and a
formal decree pro confesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon the an-
swers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has merely lost his stand-
ing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor to appear
in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final
hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits,
the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike--the defaulter as well as the
others. If it be decided in the complainant's favor, he will then be entitled to a final
decree against all. But a final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant
alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and illegal.
Id at 554.
42. Other jurisdictions have applied the Frow principle to a number of multiple liability
situations to avoid inconsistency of decrees. See, e.g., United States v. Peerless Ins. Co., 374
F.2d 942, 944-45 (4th Cir. 1967); Davis v. National Mortgagee Corp., 349 F.2d 175, 178 (2d
Cir. 1965).
43. 411 A.2d at 969-70.
1981]
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C. Damages
In a case of first impression, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held, in Firestone v. Harris," that a defaulting defendant may not intro-
duce evidence regarding liability at an exparte hearing on damages: The
defendant may, however, present evidence to mitigate the damages and
may cross-examine witnesses.
After defendant Firestone repeatedly failed to answer adequately plain-
tiffs interrogatories, the trial court entered a default against Firestone and
scheduled an exparte hearing on damages. At the hearing, the court de-
nied Firestone the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. The
court of appeals remanded for a new hearing on damages, adopting the
majority view45 that an entry of default in a claim for unliquidated dam-
ages decides only the non-defaulting party's right to recover, not the
amount of damages. Thus, although the defaulting party may not intro-
duce evidence concerning liability at the damages hearing, he is entitled to
cross-examine the witnesses and present evidence to mitigate damages.
VIII. LAW OF THE CASE
A. Motion to Dismiss
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Kritsidimas v. Sheskin,4
held that a denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was suf-
ficiently final to become the law of the case upon that issue. Such finality
precluded the movant from raising the identical issue later if no new facts
or developments in the law had arisen since the original motion was de-
nied.
After the trial court judge denied Sheskin's motion to dismiss for failure
to prosecute, Sheskin renewed the same motion at a pretrial conference
conducted by another judge. This judge granted the motion and entered
judgment for Sheskin. The court of appeals reversed, relying upon the law
of the case doctrine. Under this rule, once a court has decided an issue in a
case, that issue is settled unless reversed or modified by a higher court.4 7
The court held that the first judge's denial of the motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute had sufficient finality to become the law of the case.48
In addition, there were no new facts or changes in the substantive law
44. 414 A.2d 526 (D.C. 1980).
45. See, e.g., Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1944); Gallegos v.
Franklin, 89 N.M. 118, 547 P.2d 1160 (1976).
46. 411 A.2d 370 (D.C. 1980).
47. See generally 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.404 (2d ed. 1980).
48. 411 A.2d at 372. See also United States v. Davis, 330 A.2d 751, 755 (D.C. 1975).
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presented to the second judge when he departed from the original ruling.49
Although some jurisdictions have taken a different view,50 the court's read-
ing and application of the doctrine appears to follow that of a majority of
other jurisdictions.5
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
In P.P.P. Productions, Inc. v. W & L, Inc. ,2 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that denial of a motion to dismiss was the law of the
case when a subsequent motion for summary judgment was made on the
same grounds. In the prior motion to dismiss, W & L had argued unsuc-
cessfully that the breach of contract action of P.P.P. Productions was
barred because it was not raised as a compulsory counterclaim. Later, a
different trial judge granted W & L's motion for summary judgment ar-
gued on identical grounds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that
the prior motion to dismiss possessed sufficient finality to justify applica-
tion of the law of the case to bar consideration of the subsequent summary
judgment motion. As in the Kritsidimas"3 motion to dismiss for want of
prosecution, the motion in P.P.P. Productions demanded a detailed recon-
sideration by the court of the specific facts of the case-precisely the type
of exercise the law of the case doctrine is designed to prevent.54
IX. EXECUTION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Fehr v. McHugh, held
that a judgment from a foreign jurisdiction, which was enforceable in the
foreign state while on appeal there, was also immediately enforceable in
the District of Columbia. A Colorado court entered a money judgment
against Fehr, who immediatly appealed in Colorado, but failed to post a
supersedeas bond.56  This failure to post bond rendered the judgment im-
mediately enforceable in Colorado. Plaintiff sought to enforce the Colo-
49. 411 A.2d at 373. See also Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 805 n.l (D.C.
1978).
50. See, e.g., Castner v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 278 F.2d 376, 379-80 (9th Cir.
1960); Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 36 (Alaska 1979).
51. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Four Winds Travel, Inc., 462 F.2d 899, 904-05 (5th Cir.
1972); Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 107 (10th Cir. 1967).
52. 418 A.2d 151 (D.C. 1980).
53. See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text.
54. 418 A.2d at 153.
55. 413 A.2d 1285 (D.C. 1980).
56. A supersedeas bond is required of a party that appeals a judgment rendered against
it. From this bond, the other party may be made whole if the appeal is unsuccessful.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1289 (5th ed. 1979). See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
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rado judgment in the District of Columbia, but Fehr claimed that the
judgment could not be enforced in the District while on appeal in Colo-
rado.
The court of appeals found that as failure to post the supersedeas bond
made the judgment enforceable in Colorado, the judgment was sufficiently
final to be enforceable in the District under the full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution.5 7 In such a case, the court continued, the final-
ity of the action must be determined by the laws of the state where the
action was originally brought. And, because the judgment was final under
Colorado law, the mere pendency of an appeal would not deprive its final-
ity of the recognition it was entitled under the full faith and credit clause.
In so holding, the court was in agreement with a large number of other
jurisdictions.5"
Thomas Suddath
57. Article IV, § I of the United States Constitution states: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Under the full faith and credit clause, a judgment properly
entered by one state is entitled to the same degree of recognition in a sister state as would be
afforded in the state where the judgment was originally rendered. See Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
58. See, e.g., Maner v. Maner, 412 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1969); Fidelity Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Vidalia, Ga., 382 F. Supp. 956 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
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